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MIRANDA WARNINGS 
Need in Traffic Offenses 
This issue of the Legal Log will attempt to 
shed some light on the problem faced daily by 
police officers, that is, must Miranda warnings 
be furnished to a subject in custody for a 
traffic offense? 
In an effort to resolve this thorny question, 
a review of the Miranda decision is required. 
In 1966 in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, the 
U. S. Suprane Court handed down a landmark deci-
sion which serves as the standard in all con~ 
fession cases. 
Miranda was arrested for the kidnapping and 
forcible rape of an eighteen-year old girl. 
Miranda was twenty-three years old, indigent, 
had a ninth grade education and had an aro-
tional sexual illness. After being identified 
by the victim at the police station, Miranda 
was taken to a roan where he was interrogated. 
Miranda confessed within two hours, without 
force, threats, or promises being made by the 
police. The defendant Miranda was not infonned 
of hls right to renain Silent or thlff" 11e"""cou'lct -
have an attorney. The Suprane Court held that 
Miranda was deprived of his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination, and that in 
the future, a confession will be valid only 
after the police had advised the defendant of 
four rights. These rights must be clearly 
understood by every police officer. These 
rights must be furnished when two conditions 
exist: 
1. ) A suspect is in custody 
2.) The police intend to question 
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An in-custody situation must exist and the 
police intend to interrogate before the Miranda 
ights are -requi-red. 'l'ha-r-igh:ts_ar.e... (~ )_ t.bat a 
suspect has the right to remain silent; (2) that 
anything he says may be used against him in 
court; (3) he has the right to have the pre-
sence of an attorney; (4) if he can not afford 
an attorney, one will be appointed to represent 
him. 
Once the aforementioned rights are given, 
the subject must voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waive his rights; otherwise, any 
confession obtained will be inadmissible in 
Court. 
One area of the law that still remains un-
certain is on-the-scene questioning. When an 
officer is conducting an on-the-scene investiga-
tion of the crime where the questioning of wit-
nesses and possible suspects is involved, should 
Miranda warnings be furnished to those being 
questioned? The language of the Supreme Court 
in Miranda sheds some light on this question. 
"Our decision is not intended to hamper 
the traditional function of police of-
ficers investigating crime--when an in-
dividual is in custody on probable cause, 
the police may, of course, seek out evi-
dence in the field to be used at trial 
against hlin. Such investigation may in-
clude inquiry of persons not under res-
traint. General on-the-scene questioning 
as to facts surrounding a crime or other 
general questioning of citizens on the 
fact finding process is not affected by 
our holding. In such situations the com-
peling atmosphere of in~custody interroga-
tions is not necessarily present." 
384 U.S. at 477. 
From the Miranda decision we see, as a gen-
eral rule, that Miranda warnings need not be 
given unless there is an in-custody interroga-
tion. But what happens when a suspect is in 
custody for a ·traffic offense and is questioned 
after the arrest? In the case of Clay v. Riddle, 
541 F. 2d 456,. (1976) the United States Court Of 
Appeals for The Fourth Circuit , which is the Fed-
eral Court of Appeals for the states of South 
Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and Maryland, addressed the issue. 
In a habeas corpus proceeding, appellant 
David Clay asked the court to vacate his con-
viction as a habitual offender, a felony under 
the state law of Virginia. His argument for set-
ting aside his conviction was that during his 
trial critical incrllninating evidence was ad-
mitted contrary to the rule of Miranda v. Ari-
zona. The state of Virginia, through the Super-
intendent of the penitentiary where Clay was con-
fined, denied that Clay's Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrlinination was violated, con-
tending that while such testimony was introduced, 
it consisted only of Clay's statement to the of-
ficer, who had arrested hlin for driving an auto-
mobile while intoxicated, that he was the driver 
in the one car accident. The Fourth Circuit 
ruled that Clay's statement was admissible 
although he had not been furnished Miranda 
warnings. 
The facts out of which Clay's arrest and 
conviction arose are as follows: 
On the afternoon of April 25, 1972 
in Halifax County, Virginia, a Sheriff's 
Deputy answering a report of an auto-
mobile accident, saw a 1970 green Ford 
off the road, down an enbankment . He 
found Clay lying on the ground about 
t\\0--tenths of a mile from the car and 
waving a gun at a State Trooper. The 
Deputy and other Troopers persuaded Clay 
to surrender, handcuffed him and arrested 
him on a charge of driving while under 
the influence of alcohol, a misdemeanor, 
Code of Va., 1950, as amended, §§ 18.1-54 
and -55. 541 F. 2d at 457. 
While on the way to the hospital for a breath 
test, Clay was asked his identity and the cir-
cumstances of the accident. The police officer 
did not advise Clay of his Miranda rights. Clay 
gave his name and said that "the car just got 
away from [me]" without further involving himself. 
It is admitted that Clay had been declared a 
"habitual offender" under Virginia state law and 
thus his driving an automobile was a felony, how-
ever, •the Trooper was not aware of this statute 
until after Clay was placed in jail. At that 
time Clay was adVised of his Miranda rights and 
charged with the felony. 
In it's decision that appellant Clay was not 
entitled to Miranda warnings before being ques-
tioned by the arresting officer, The Fourth Cir-
cuit Court Of Appeals observed, "it is note-
worthy that the unlawful incident was a caim::m-
place event--a traffic offense--a breach of law 
to which we believe the Supreme Court decision 
does not extend. This circumst~ce alone--not 
that the misconduct was a misdemeanor as to which 
Miranda has been said to be inapp)si te--is the 
basis of our present holding that Miranda ~­
ings were not required to justify receptio~~f 
Clay's acknowledgement that he was driving the 
car." 541 F. 2d at 457. 
In reaching its decision that Miranda warnings 
are not required in traffic arrest, the Fourth 
Circuit cited several cases from other jurisdic-
tions, which for the sake of brevity are omitted, 
that Miranda warnings are not required.' in any 
misdemeanor cases. However, the Court did not 
rule bn the applicability of Mtranda in -misde-
meanors but, instead, lllni ted its decision as to 
whether it is required in traffic offenses. 
While there is no South Carolina Supreme Oouit 
decision directly on point, it is the opinion of 
the editors that our state court would be guided 
by the reasoning in the Fourth Circuit's decision 
in Clay v. Riddle and hold that Miranda warnings 
are not required in traffic offenses. 
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